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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ST ATE OF UT AH

EMPIRE CORPORATION,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.
EMPIRE CREDIT, INC. ,
Case No. 16237

Defendant,
ED T. OLSEN and MARLENE
SINE,
Defendants
and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action on a promissory note executed by defendant Empire
Credit,

Inc. ,

respondent,

in favor of Valley Bank and Trust Company, claimed by

Empire

Corporation,

to have been sold and assigned to it.

Defendants and appellants, Ed T. Olsen and Marlene Sine, were joined as
defendants in the action on the theory that Empire Credit, Inc., was their
alter ego and that they were liable because they were trustees of the assets
of the defendant corporation and had misapplied those assets.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case has not been tried.

On October 19, 1976, on the ground that

defendants had failed to comply with discovery submitted by the plaintiff and
to obey various orders of the court compelling compliance, the court entered
findings

of fact and conclusions of law and a judgment in favor of the

plaintiff and against all of the defendants for $84, 788. 78, including interest
and attorneys' fees.
Following
conditionally

entry
vacating

of

the

the

judgment,

judgment

and

various

orders

staying

were

execution

entered

until,

on

September 13, 1978, Honorable G. Hal Taylor entered an order ratifying and
affirming the judgment and directing execution to issue.

Subsequently, in an

I

order of January 8, 1979, Judge Taylor entered an order denying a motion to
vacate the judgment.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants and appellants, Ed T. Olsen and Marlene Sine. seek reversal
of the trial court's order denying their motion to vacate the judgment,

anc

remand of the case to the District Court of Salt Lake County with directions
to vacate the judgment and set the matter for trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 21, 1972, approximately two weeks before the action would
have been barred by the statute of limitations, Empire Corporation filed ;
complaint against Empire Credit, Inc., EdT. Olsen, and Marlene Sine.in
which it was averred that Empire Credit, Inc. , had executed a $50, ODO note
in favor of Valley Bank and Trust Company, that only a sma ll amoun

- 2 -
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t bad

I

been paid on it, and that prior to the commencement of the action Valley
Bank and Trust Company had sold and assigned to Empire Corporation all of
the bank's right, title and interest in the note.
In a second claim, Empire Corporation averred that defendants Olsen and
Sine were "officers, directors and sole stockholders" of Empire Credit, and
that Empire Credit was the alter ego of the individual defendants, making
them jointly and severally on the note.
In a third claim, Empire Corporation averred that defendants Olsen and
Sine having caused or permitted the corporate charter of Empire Credit to be
suspended and having withdrawn the assets of the corporation for their own
benefit, they were liable to Empire Corporation, as a creditor, for the amount
of the note.

Judgment was demanded for $45, 500, with interest at 7 percent

per annum from October 10, 1966, and for a reasonable attorney's fee in the
sum of $8, 000, and for costs (R. 2-4).
During the course of the proceedings, motions to dismiss, for leave to
file a third party complaint, to dismiss the third party complaint, together
with an answer to the complaint were filed, but the 446 page record, which
does not include any transcript of testimony, is made up almost entirely of
interrogatories, answers to interrogatories, and motions for sanctions, and of
judgments, motions, and memorandums related to them.
The incidents leading to this appeal began on November 9, 1972, when
the plaintiff

served a

set of interrogatories upon the defendants.

The

interrogatories were not answered, and nothing was done to advance the case
for more

than

a year.

Then, on January 14, 1974, counsel for Empire

Corporation filed a motion for sanctions, including striking of the motion to
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dismiss and awarding judgment by default, on the ground that the defendants
had not answered those interrogatories ( R. 49).
Yocom

withdrew

as

defendants'

counsel

Two days later, David E.

(R. 52),

and

on

February 4,

Jay D. Edmunds entered his appearance (R. 54).
On January 18,

1974,

the motion for sanctions was continued without

date (R. 53) and lay dormant until January 9, 1975, when counsel for Empire
Corporation

filed

a

notice

sanctions (R. 55).

of hearing on the motions to dismiss and for

The motions were set for hearing on January 17,

counsel for defendants did not appear.
motion

to

defendants

dismiss
were

and

granting

ordered

to

An order was entered denying the

the motion

answer

the

but

for

sanctions

interrogatories

(R. 56).

The

and produce the

I

·documents within 20 days of January 27, 1975, and the order provided that in
the event they did not comply,

judgment would be entered on ex

~

application of counsel for Empire Corporation (R. 58).
After various motions and hearings, the court entered an amended order
on April 29,
p .m.

1975,

giving defendants until April 30,

1975,

at 5: 00 o'clock

to answer the interrogatories or have judgment entered against them

(R. 61), and on April 30, 1975, at 4: 03 p. m. , answers to the interrogatories
were filed (R. 62).

I

On that same day, a formal order was entered giving the

defendants until April 30 to file the answers to interrogatories (R. 89).

for

On May 29,

1975,

admissions,

and

defendants.

Empire Corporation served interrogatories, requests I
requests

for

production

of

documents

upon the

These discovery documents contained four pages of definitions,
i

plus another four pages of definitions attached as Appendix "A".
"identify"

occupied

two

and

one-half

pages

of

th e

t ex t ,

The term '

and

in

the

interrogatories the defendants were asked to "identify" numerous items and ,
transactions ( R. 90) .
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On June 6, 1975, a minute order granted the plaintiff's motion to strike
the answer and enter judgment, but there is no indication in the file that any
notice of a hearing on this motion had been sent, and only the plaintiff's
counsel appeared (R. 116).

On June 19, 1975, defendants filed a motion for

extension of time to comply with discovery, referring to the documents served
upon them on May 29 (R. 118).
On July 7, 1975, plaintiff's counsel filed another motion for judgment or
sanctions,

claiming

that

the

defendants

had

not

fully

answered

Interrogatories 5(a)(3) through 5(a)(l3) of the interrogatories that had been
served in November of 1972 and answered in April of 1975 (R. 140).
A hearing

on

this motion was

set for July 21.

Plaintiff's counsel

appeared but counsel for defendant did not, and Honorable Bryant H. Croft
entered a minute order granting the motion for judgment (R. 141).

This was

followed by a formal order dated July 30, 1975 (R. 147) in which the answer
of the defendants were stricken, their default entered, and judgment entered
for $45, 500,

plus $27, 992. 97

interest, $5 ,000 attorneys' fees, and $28. 50

costs for a total judgment of $81, 521. 49.
A motion

to

set aside

this

judgment was made on August 11, 1975

(R. 149), which motion was finally heard on September 9, 1975, at which time
Honorable Marcellus K. Snow entered a minute order granting the motion to
set aside the judgment, gave defendants 15 days to answer, and awarded
plaintiffs an attorney's fee of $50.
Nothing further appears to have been done until April 20, 1976, when
plaintiff's

counsel

filed

a

motion

to

strike

the minute order (R · 155) ·

Argument on this motion was continued a number of time, but on August 17,
1976, Judge Snow signed an order vacating the judgment and giving the
defendants 15 days to answer the interrogatories (R. 166) ·
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On

September 22,

1976,

plaintiff's

counsel filed

a motion

to st

defendant's answer and to enter a default judgment (R. 167), which
argued

before

(R. 170).

On

Judge

Snow

October 13,

on

October 6,

1976,

and

defendants

taken
served

under adviset
objections

to

interrogatories and a motion for an extension of time, setting a hearing
October 22, (R. 171), but on October 19, Judge Snow entered findings
fact and conclusions of law, and a default judgment against the defend<
for $84,788.78 (R. 174-179).
Entry of the judgment was followed by various motions for stays
execution, to set aside the judgment. to strike affidavits, for imposition
attorneys' fees.

By a minute order of November 22, 1976 (R. 204) all moti1

were continued to November 24, 1976, at 2:00 o'clock p.m., at which time
motion to set aside the judgment was taken under advisement by Judge Sr
(R. 205).

At about this time Joseph H. Bottum and Clyde C. Patterson filed th

appearance as co-counsel for defendants (R. 215), and affidavits were fi;

respecting the illness of the defendants' then counsel, Jay D. Edmunds, a
the illness of defendant Ed T. Olsen (R. 216).

No minute order appears to have been entered, but on December 3
1976,

Judge

Snow signed and entered an order (prepared by plaintifl

counsel) requiring payment of $1,000 attorneys' fees to plaintiff and providii
that the judgment entered on October 19, 1976, would be vacated and
aside
. . . at such time as
defendants have fully answered
interrogatories and requests for admissions submitted by
plaintiff, and have produced the documents required to .be
produced under the terms of plaintiff's request for product~on
of documents, and have fully complied with the terms of prior
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orders ~ntered in . this matter requiring the defendants to
answer mterrogatones and/or requests for admissions and to
produce documents (R. 272).
The order also provided in paragraph 2 as follows:
In the eve.nt that defendants fail to fully comply with the
conditions imposed under the terms of Paragraph # 1 above
within 30 days after entry of this order then defendants'
motion to vacate and set aside the judment e~tered herein on or
about the 24th day of November, 1976, is hereby denied
(R. 273).
On
Default

the

following

Judgment

day

and

Judge Snow entered an order "Setting Aside

Imposing

Terms,"

which

had

Joseph H. Bottum and Clyde C. Patterson (R. 274-275).

been

prepared

by

That order provided

as follows:
It is hereby ordered that the default judgment in favor of the
plaintiff, Empire Corporation, and against the defendant,
Empire Credit, Inc. , heretofore entered by this court be and
the same hereby is dismissed and set aside subject to the
payment by the defendant of the sum of $1,000 in attorneys'
fees to the plaintiff for the use and benefit of the plaintiff's
attorney, Ronald Barker.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the said $1, 000 in
attorneys' fees shall be paid within 30 days of the signing and
filing of this order by the court and that in the event the said
$1, 000 is not paid within the said 30 days from the date of
signing and filing of this order, the defendants' motion to set
aside default judgment shall be considered to be denied and the
default judgment heretofore entered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant shall be reinstated.
On
(R. 276),

January 18,
and

on

1977,

defendants

January 27,

Interrogatories

No. 1

(R. 292-300),

and

and

No. 5

answers

to

filed

they
of
the

an answer to the complaint

filed

those

supplemental

served

on

interrogatories

answers

November 9,
of

May 25,

to
1972
1975

(R. 301-310), as well as an amended answer to the complaint CR. 311) ·
On March 28,

1977, Judge Snow entered an order striking the order

entered on December 31, 1976, which had been presented by Joseph Bottum,
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and affirming the order of December 30, 1976, which had been presented by
Ronald Barker (R. 336).
At this point, things began to deteriorate.

On June 2, 1977, plaintiff

filed a "Motion to Strike Stay Order and to Confirm Judgment" (R. 340-342)
prio~

taking the position that defendants had violated the court's

order by

objecting to some of the interrogatories rather than answering them.

This

motion was heard by Honorable Dean E. Conder on June 22, 1977, at which
time he entered a minute order denying the motion in part and requiring the
defendants to furnish income tax returns from 1972 forward (R. 355).

This

minute order ultimately became the basis for three separate orders presented
to Judge Conder by the plaintiff's counsel on three separate occasions, all of
them signed by Judge Conder.
On

July 18,

1977,

Judge

Conder

signed

the

following

order

(R. 356-357):
ORDERED, as follows:
1.
That the defendant shall, within 20 days from the
date of said hearing fully answer interrogatory # 10 of the
interrogatories submitted by plaintiff about May 27, 1975.
The defendants shall, within ten days after the date
2.
of said hearing, produce for inspection and copying the counsel
for plaintiff, copies of income tax returns for the years 1972
and thereafter.
As to tax returns of which the defendants
have no copies defendants are to within ten days from the date
of said hearing order copies of said tax returns from the Utah
Tax Commission and from the Internal Revenue Service, and
shall furnish copies of said returns to counsel for plaintiff upon
receipt therefrom from said taxing authorities.
3.
Plaintiff's motion to strike the stay order and to
confirm the judgment herein is denied in part without prejudice·
[On July 22,

1977,

the

defendants filed an answer to Interrogator>

No. 10, and served notice upon plaintiff's counsel that the tax returns would
be available for inspection on July 27 at 11: 00 a. m. l
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On

November 30,

1977,

long

after

Interrogatory

No. 10

had

been

answered, Judge Conder's second order (prepared by plaintiff's counsel) was
entered.

It provided, in pertinent part, as follows (R. 361-362):

ORDERED, as follows:
That defendants shall furnish to plaintiff for inspection
and copying the income tax returns for the years 1972, 1973,
1974, 1975 and 1976 filed with Internal Revenue Service and the
Utah State Tax Commission by each of the defendants. To the
extent that defendants do not have copies of said tax returns
in their possession or available to them they are ordered to
forthwith apply for and to obtain copies thereof from the
governmental agency with whom said tax returns were filed.
Defendants are order to make those tax returns available to
counsel for plaintiff within 30 days.
2.
That defendants shall fully, completely, truthfully
and accurately ~ interrogatory # 10 of the interrogatories
dated May 27, 1975, within 20 days.
Plaintiff's motion to
compel answers to interrogatories # 2, 8, 9 and 12 is denied.
3.
Plaintiff's motion to strike the stay of enforcement of
the judgment entered herein, which stay order is dated about
October 20, 1977, is denied at this time upon condition that
defendants fully comply with all of the terms of this order. In
the event that defendants fail to fully comply with the terms of
said order plaintiff's motion to strike stay order and to confirm
judgment is granted. (Emphasis added.)
On December 8,

1977, plaintiff's counsel sent to Judge Conder a third

order based on the minute order of June 22, 1977.

As submitted, this order

was identical with the one entered on November 30, 1977, but as signed by
Judge Conder there was a significant change.

Paragraph 2 was amended by

striking from it the words "fully, completely, truthfully and accurately,

11

so

that the paragraph in the order as signed by Judge Conder reads as follows:
The
defendant shall answer interrogatory # 10 of the
interrogatories dated May 27, 1975, with~ 20 days. Plaintiff'. s
motion to compel answers to Interrogatones # 2, 8, 9 and 12 is
denied.
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The foregoing orders are of importance, because the asserted failure of
defendants to obey the order of Judge Conder appears to be the primary .
basis for plaintiff's

subsequent motion that execution issue, and for tht

court's granting of that motion.
On May 9, 1978, plaintiff's counsel served upon the defendants additional
interrogatories and requests for admissions (R. 363), which patently were
designed to establish the fact that in answering Interrogatory No. 10 the
defendants had failed to list all real property that they owned or had owned, I
I

that they had not complied with Judge Conder's order, and that plaintiffs
therefore should retain their $85, 000 judgment without having to try the
matter on its merits .
On

August 15,

1978,

plaintiff's

counsel

filed

Directing Clerk to Issue Execution" (R. 382-385).

a

"Motion

for Order

In support of the motion,

the plaintiff set out some of the foregoing history, then referred specifically
to the order of Judge Conder:
6.
About June l, 1977, plaintiff filed a motion to strike
Judge Snow's order staying enforcement of the judgment (see
paragraph No. 2 above).
7.
That motion was heard by Judge Conder about
June 22, 1977. Judge Conder ordered defendants to produce
certain income tax returns within 30 days. Those tax returns
were not made available within said period. Defendants filed a
pleading dated July 20, 1977, wherein they stated that the tax
returns would be made availabe for inspection July 27, 1977, at
11:00 a.m., however they were not in fact made available at
that time.
See also letter of November 9, 1977, Exhibit "I"
attached hereto, wherein counsel for defendants indicate that
they will thereafter produce the tax returns (which they
eventially did do).
8.
Judge Conder also ordered the defendants "fully,
completely, truthfully and accurately answer interrogatory # 10
of the interrogatories dated May 27, 1975, within 20 days·"
Under date of July 21, 1977, the defendants Marlene Sine and
Ed Olsen filed sworn answers to said Interrogatory No 10
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stating that the information furnished in that answer disclosed
all interests in real property that the defendant then "have or
have had . . . during the discovery period."
9.

Further investigation by plaintiff disclosed that the
had
not
"fully,
completely,
truthfully,
or
accurately answered that interrogatory (# 10 of the May 27
1975, interrogatories) as had been ordered by Judge Conder'.
Under date of May 8, 1978, plaintiff caused requests for
admissions and interrogatories to be submitted to defendants
requiring them to admit that they owned interests in
approximately 8 parcels of real property which had not been
disclosed by their answers to said Interrogatory # 10.
Attached to said request for admissions as exhibits were title
reports showing the ownership and/or financial interest of the
defendants in and to various parcels of real property in Salt
Lake and Summit Counties.
Defendants did not deny those
requests for admissions within the time required under Rule 36,
URCP, or at all, and accordingly said request for admissions
are deemed admitted as provided in said Rule 36, URCP.
defendant~,

10. Judge Conder conditionally denied pli!intiff's Motion to
Strike the Order of Judge Snow Staying Enforcement of the
Judgment (paragraph # 2 above), and ordered that in the event
that defendants failed to fully comply with the terms of the
order that plaintiff's motion to strike the stay order and to
confirm the judgment was granted.

***

11. Under the terms of Judge Conder's order and in view
of the admissions by defendants that they owned interests in
approximately 8 parcels of real property which were not
disclosed in their answer to said Interrogatory # 10 (dated
May 27, 1975), the stay order has been vacated, the judgment
has been confirmed, and the clerk should be directed to issue
execution and other process in aid of enforcement and collection
of that judgment.
Hearing on this motion was set for September 5, 1978, but on that date
by a minute order Judge Taylor continued the hearing to September 12.

September 11,
motion

for

1978,

leave

to

Jay D.

Edmunds,

withdraw,

On

who was plaintiff's counsel, filed a

noticing

a

hearing

(R. 389), and sending a copy to the defendants.

for

October 3,

1978

On September 12, 1978,

the date set for hearing the motion for execution, the court also considered
the application of Mr. Edmunds to withdraw as counsel, and Judge Taylor
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granted the motion for leave to withdraw at the same time that he granted the
motion for issuance of execution (R. 391).

On September 13, 1978, Judge

Taylor entered a formal order that execution issue and that the judgment be
ratified and confirmed CR. 393).
Thereafter, new counsel appeared for the defendants and moved the
court to vacate the judgment and to stay the execution (R. 397-400).

These

matters were heard by the court on December 11, at which time Judge Taylor

appeal was filed by I
I
defendants Marlene Sine and Ed T. Olsen (R. 419) and a supersedeas bond
denied

the

motion

to

vacate.

Following

that,

an

wasfiled(R. 435).

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO
VACATE THE JUDGMENT.
Other disciplines have names for it.

In genetics it would be a mutation; ,

in physics, an uncontrolled reaction; in psychology, a derangement; in logic
or semantics, a paradox; in printing, pied type.

American jurisprudence has

no established term for it, but "procedure run amuck" seems appropriate
Here, because of neglectful counsel, use of discovery for harassment, iffy
judgments and orders , and an unmanageable record, the appellants are the
victims of an oppressive judgment in spite of a meritorious defense.
The judgment is one which should not have been entered, which was
vacated conditionally, in which the conditions were met, but which the triai
court

finally

"ratified

and

reaffirmed."

Under

all

the

facts

anc

circumstances, the appellants should have relief from that judgment, havin!
timely moved to vacate itpursuant

to

Rule 60(b),

Utah

Rules

Procedure, which provides:
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of

Civi

.
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
m the fuz:therance of . just~ce relieve a party or his legal
representa.tive from a fmal Judgment, order or proceeding for
the following reasons: ( 1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
ex~usable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresenation or other
misconduct of an adverse party; ( 4) when, for any ~ause, the
summons in an action has not been personally served upon the
defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void;
(6) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged,
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed
or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for
reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than three months after
the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.

***

When was the "judgment, order or proceeding" entered or taken?

Was it

October 19, 1976, when first entered by Judge Snow, or September 13, 1978,
when it was ratified and reaffirme.d by Judge Taylor?

If the former, the first

four reasons for vacation of the judgment may not be available; if the latter,
they are.

We believe it was the latter, but, in any event, relief may be

granted under subdivision (7), which permits the vacation of a judgment for
"any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."

The

subdivision has been broadly applied by this and other courts.
In Dixon ~. Dixon, 121 Utah 259, 240 P. 2d 1211, 1213

(1952), the trial

court had entered a minute order providing for temporary custody and other
matters during the pendency of the action.
order along

the lines of the

Thereafter, it signed a formal

temporary order,

but proporting to be a

permanent order with respect to custody and distribution of property·

A

motion to vacate the formal order was filed more than three months after
entry of the order, but this court approved the action of the trial court in
vacating the formal order.

The court said:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 13 -

It is therefore apparent that counsel who presented the order
of March 8, 1950, had prepared it with no recollection of the
provisions of the stipulation, and that the judge signed the
formal order under a mistaken belief that it conformed to an
order theretofore made.
In Ney
defendants,

~-

Harrison, 5 Utah 2d 217, 299 P.2d 1114 (1956), qne of the

Alda

Harrison,

failed

to

answer

the

complaint because she ,

believed her former husband would handle the matter, and a default judgment
was entered against her.

Almost 11 months later, she moved for vacation of ,

the judgment and the relief was granted by the trial court.

This court held I

that the asserted ground for relief properly came within the provisions of
subdivision ( 7) of Rule 60(b).

The court said:

The statutory authority of trial courts to set aside
judgments obtained by default has been liberally construed to
the end that there be trial on the merits, beginning with our
earliest decisions.
In the recent case of Warren v. Dixon
Ranch Co. [Utah, 260 P. 2d 741, 742], we had occasion to
review the policy considerations and reaffirmed the attitude of
liberal construction, thus:
"The allowance of a vacation of judgment is a
creature of equity designed to relieve against
harshness of enforcing a judgment, which may
occur through procedural difficulties, the wrongs
of the opposing party, or misfortunes which
prevent the presentation of a claim or defense.
Equity considers factors which may be
irrelevant in actions at law, such as the
hardship in granting or denying relief. Although
an equity court no longer has complete discretion
in granting or denying relief it may exercise wide
judicial discretion in weighing the factors of
fairness and public convenience, and this court
on appeal will reverse the trial court only where
an abuse of discretion is clearly shown."

***

***

The trial court could well regard this as among the class
of cases that Rule 60(b)(7) was intended to govern and to
permit Alda to justify her failure to answer on the groun.d that
the divorce decree required her husband to bear the obligation
and required him to defend the action for her.
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I
!

In Stewart ~. Sullivan, 29 Utah 2d 156, 506 P. 2d 74 (1973), the court
entered orders in two consolidated cases dismissing them with prejudice on
the ground that

the

plaintiff had failed to answer interrogatories.

The

attorney for the plaintiff was subsequently suspended from practice, new
counsel was obtained,

and more than a year after the judgment had been

entered the court vacated it and entered a new judgment dismissing the
actions without prejudice.

In holding that the order vacating the judgment

had properly been entered by the trial court, this court considered a number
of circumstances.

The court said:

There are certain circumstances in connection with this
matter that should be noted.
The plaintiff had answered
interrogatories submitted to him by the defendant Richard
Monk Allen prior to the consolidation of the two cases. The
interrogatories and the answers are substantially the same as
those submitted to the plaintiff by the defendant Sullivan.
After the consolidation of the cases that information was
available to all parties.
At the time the first order of
dismissal was entered it appears that the court and counsel for
the defendant Allen were of the impression that the order made
was a dismissal without prejudice. In a telephone conversation
between counsel for the defendant Allen and counsel for the
plaintiff, Allen's counsel informed counsel for the plaintiff that
the dismissal was without prejudice.
Plaintiff had no
knowledge of the dismissal and subsequent motions made in
respect thereto.
It was not until several months after his
counsel became incapacitated to represent him and the plaintiff
had employed other counsel he learned what had transpired.
In view of the above recited circumstances and the fact
that there was no disposition of the case on the merits, we are
of the opinion that the court below did not abu~e ~ts disc:etion
in its determination that the action should be dismissed without
prejudice.
The provisions of Rule 60(b)(7) are sufficien.tly
broad to permit the court to set aside its former order which
appeared to have been entered upon an erroneous assumpti?n
and to enter a new order based upon the record before it.
Other
"catch-all"

courts
portion

have found additional situations which come within the
of

Rule 60(b).

Our

subdivision (7)

is the same as

subdivision ( 6) of Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure·

L. P.
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Steuart,

Inc.

v.

Matthews,

329 F. 2d

somewhat similar to the present one.
badly mishandled the suit.

234

(D. C. Cir.

1964),

is a case

In that case the plaintiff's counsel

In October 1960, the complaint was dismissed,

after notice to plaintiff's then counsel, for failure to prosecute. 1 Two years

later, on October 22, 1962, the plaintiff by new counsel moved to reinstate,
the suit.

The district court granted the motion, defendant appealed, and the

judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.
The court noted that the former counsel had been "beset with personal
problems" which involved the serious illness of his wife and recent deaths of
his parents, that the plaintiffs and others in plaintiffs' behalf had made
numerous inquiries of the counsel who refused to answer them and who
assured the plaintiff from time to time that the case was proceeding although
there was no foundation for

counsel's

reassuring statements.

When the

plaintiff learned by personally checking the court records that the case had
been dismissed for failure to prosecute, his former counsel told him steps
would be taken to reinstate the case, but no action was taken.

On appeal of

the district court's order vacating the judgment, the appellant claimed that
the motion to reinstate the judgment was barred by the one-year time limit in
Clause (1), concerning excusable neglect, which corresponds in the Federal
Rules with the three-month time limit in the Utah Rules.

The court of

appeals said:
But the district court did not act on the theory of
excusable neglect. On the contrary, it expressly applied the
"'catch-all' rule" 60(b) ( 6). Counsel's neglect was not excusable
and the court, by clear implication, so found. The judge felt
"that in this particular case the client, plaintiff, a person
unfamiliar with court procedures, should not be penalized by
the action of his counsel who admittedly did not attend to the
matter when he received' notice of the contemplated dismissal."
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On the part of Matthews [plaintiff] himself there was no
neglect.
Clause (1) of Rule 60( b) is not and Clause ( 6)
is broad enough to permit relief when as in this case personal
problems of counsel cause him grossly to neglect a diligent
client's case and mislead the client. Clause (6) "vests power in
courts adequate to enable them to vacate judgments whenever
such action is appropriate to accomplish justice. 11

***

The holding and reasoning of the Steuart case was followed in King v.
Mordowanec, 46 F. R. D. 474 (D. C. R. I. 1969), vacating a judgment because of
the neglect of counsel,

though

the motion

to vacate was not filed for

approximately a year and nine months after dismissal of the suit.
In the present case there is a strange conglomeration of circumstances.
There was attorney neglect, much of it inexcusable.

A set of interrogatories

was served upon defendants' counsel on November 9, 1972, but between that
date and January 14, 1974, some 14 months later, nothing had been done with
respect to answering the interrogatories or arguing the motion to dismiss the
complaint,

and within two days after service of the motion for sanctions,

plaintiff's

then attorney

resigned and was replaced by Jay D. Edmunds.

Then, on January 18, 1974, the motion for sanctions was continued without
date,

and

nothing

11 months later,

more

was

done

in

the

case until January 9,

1975,

when plaintiff's counsel set a hearing for the motions to

dismiss and the motion for sanctions.

Defendant's counsel did not appear;

the motion to dismiss was denied, and the motion for sanctions was granted.
An order

was

entered that the discovery would be complied with within

20 days of January 27, 1975.

Nothing was done, and on April 22, 1975, some

three months later, plaintiff's counsel filed a notice of motion for judgment.
On

June 6,

1975,

plaintiff's counsel appeared before the Honorable

Maurice Harding at which time Judge Harding granted plaintiff's motion to
strike defendants' answer and enter judgment.

Defendants' counsel was not
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present.

On July 7, 1975, a notice was sent out that plaintiff's motion for

judgment or sanctions would be heard on July 21, 1975.

Defendants' counsel

did .not

was

appear

and

plaintiff's

motion

for

judgment

granted.

On

I

August 28, 1975, the parties appeared and argued a motion to 'set aside the
judgment.

The court granted the motion and gave the defendants 15 days

within which to answer.

Counsel did not prepare an order for the judge's

signature and did not prepare any answers as required, and on April 20,
1976, more than seven months later, plaintiff's counsel moved to strike the
minute entry.

Arguments on this motion were continued several times and

finally, on June 29, 1976, it was continued without date.
Finally,

on

October 19,

1976,

after argument,

Judge

Snow entered

findings of fact and conclusions of law and a judgment for $84, 788. 78. A
motion to set the judgment aside was filed by counsel, set for argument on
October 29,

and

again

continued

several times,

finally

to be heard on

November 24, 1976.
At this point, affidavits were filed indicating that defendants' counsel
had been ill between August 28 and late September or early October and it
was impossible for him to carry on a professional practice.

At about this

same time, Joseph H. Bottum and Clyde C. Patterson appeared as co-counsel
for the defendants, but the basis for their appearance is not clear and it may
be inferred from the file that they were retained by Mr. Edmunds to help hiJ11
out of his predicament.

There is no indication that the new counsel were in

contact with the defendants, or were retained by the defendants.

They were

never heard from again.
On August 15, 1978, plaintiff's counsel moved for an order directing the
clerk to issue execution on the judgment that had been entered on
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October 19, 1976, and conditionally vacated thereafter.

The matter was set

for hearing on September 5 at which time Mr. Edmunds "moved the court for
an order continuing hearing on this matter for one week to give defendants
an opportunity to employ new counsl."

This motion was granted on condition

that the defendants pay to counsel for plaintiff the sum of $100 as attorneys'
fees.

But it was not until September 11, 1978, the day before that set for

hearing of the motion for execution, that a notice of the motion for leave to
withdraw as counsel was mailed to the defendants, and on the following day,
counsel for plaintiff having "waived time for hearing of that motion," the
court granted the motion to withdraw in the same breath that it granted the
motion

for

execution.

This

was

hardly

an

atmosphere

in

which

the

defendants' counsel would be expected to devote his best efforts to resisting
the plaintiff's motion for issuance of execution.
The record contains 24· minute orders which were entered during the
tenure of Mr. Edmunds as counsel for the defendants.

In ten of those 24

either no counsel is listed as having been present for the defendants, or
Mr. Edmunds' s name is followed by "NP" --not present.
Added to the neglect of counsel in this case is the tactic of plaintiff's
counsel with respect to the use of discovery.

A review of the file shows that

the plaintiff's counsel was among those who have been using the discovery
methods for the purposes of harassment rather than as legitimate devises to
aid in the preparation for trial.

The definitions employed by the plaintiff's

counsel make it almost impossible for one to answer the interrogatories as
fully as demanded, at least not within the current year·

.
. d
with
The various orders as presented to and signed by the JU ges
respect to judgments and conditional vacations of those judgments were such
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as to leave anyone confused as to the status of the case.

It is impossible to

tell from reading of the file whether there was a judgment or not at any

particular time--a fact attributable in large measure to the method used by

For example, in' the court's

plaintiff's counsel in the preparation of orders.
order of December 30,

1976

(R. 272-273),

paragraph 1 provided that the

judgment would be vacated and set aside upon the performance of certain
conditions such as the payment of $1, 000 and compliance with discovery

Paragraph 2 provided that in event the defendants failed to fully comply with

the conditions "then defendants' motion to vacate and set aside the judgment
entered herein on or about

the

24th day of November,

1976, is hereby

denied," creating confusion as to when the effective date of the denial would
be.
In

Judge

Conder's order of November 29,

1977--the second in the

series--the plaintiff's motion to strike the stay of enforcement of the judgment
was denied upon condition, following which there was a provision that:
In the event that defendants fail to fully comply with the terms
of said order plaintiff's motion to strike stay order and to
confirm judgment is granted.
Then there is the same language in the court's third order of December 9.
1977.

Orders so phrased make it impossible for counsel to determine whether

there is a judgment or whether there isn't;
exeuction

or

whether

there

confirmed or whether it hasn't.

isn't;

whether there is a stay

01

and whether the judgment has beer

Orders of this type contribute to the genera

disarray pervading this record.
Finally, the court committed other serious errors.

Much of the materii

that is found in the record and which has been set out in the brief i
valuable to this court in considering the history of the case, but the matte!
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directly affecting the point raised on this appeal center around the three
orders entered by Judge Conder,

and the plaintiff's motion for an order

directing execution.
The events leading directly to this appeal began on June 2, 1977, when
the plaintiff filed a motion to strike a stay order previously issued and to
confirm the judgment which had been entered on October 19, 1976.
matter was
entered

a

This

heard by Judge Conder on June 22, 1977, at which time he
minute

order

denying

the

motion in part and directing the

defendants to furnish income tax returns and to answer Interrogatory No. 10.
This minute order was followed by a formal order, signed by Judge Conder
on July 18,

that the defendants would answer Interrogatory No. 10

1977,

within 20 days of May 27, 1975, and produce income tax returns.
On July 22,

defendants' counsel mailed to plaintiff's counsel a

1977,

notice that the tax returns would be available on July 22 and also sent an
answer to Interrogatory No: 10.
1977,

plaintiff's

counsel

Four months later, on about November 30,

presented

to

the

court

an

order

which

substantially different from that signed by Judge Conder on July 18.
one directed
already

the

been

defendants

answered)

was
This

to answer Interrogatory No. 10 (which had

"fully,

completely,

truthfully,

and

accurately."

Thereafter a third order, identical to the second, was presented to Judge
Conder

by

December 9,

plaintiff's
1977,

counsel,

Judge

but when he signed the third order on

Conder

struck

the

words

"fully,

completely,

truthfully, and accurately" in directing an answer to Interrogatory No· 10 ·
Nevertheless, when the plaintiff filed its motion for an order directing
the clerk to issue execution, no mention was made of the conflicting orders of
Judge Conder, and reference was made only to the language in the order of
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November 30 that the defendants would answer Interrogatory No. 10 "fully,
completely, truthfully and accurately."

It was not pointed out in the motion,

or thereafter to Judge Taylor so far as the record appears, that

~ere

been a subsequent order by Judge Conder eliminating those words.

had

And the

factual basis for the motion, presented to Judge Taylor and apparently relied

1

I

upon by him, was that the defendants had not answered Interrogatory No. 10
"truthfully" because they had failed to list some parcels of real property that
were then or had once been in

their names.

Thus,

as in Stewart

~

~- i

Sullivan, 29 Utah 2d, 156, 506 P. 2d 74 ( 1973) , cited above, both the court
and counsel were suffering under a misapprehension as to the contents of the
record and the status of the case.

I

The misapprehension is understandable,

considering the record that has been generated, but to be understandable is
not justification for imposing upon a party an unwarranted judgment and

I

refusing to vacate it when the true facts are pointed out.
In considering the plaintiff's motion for an order directing the clerk to
issue execution, the trial court erred in another significant respect.

It was

improper for the trial court to consider the withdrawal motion of attorney
Edmunds at the same hearing at which Mr. Edmunds was supposed to be
protecting the interests of his clients.

Rule 2. 5 of the Rules of Practice in

the District Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah provides:

***

When an attorney
withdraws from the case or ceases
to act as an attorney, the party to an action for whom such
attorney was acting, must before any further proceedings are
had against him, be required by the adverse party, by written
notice to appoint another attorney or to appear in person.
This was

not done

in

this

case.

Indeed the trial court permitted

withdrawal at the same moment that he was considering final disposition of tbe
case.

Although plaintiff's counsel argued that Joseph Bottum and Clyde C
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Patterson were co-counsel and that no such notice was necessary, it is
apparent from the record that their appearance was for a single purpose.
After

appearing

Mr. Edmunds

on

had

an

been

early
ill

and

motion
not

to

vacate

attending

to

a

judgment,

business,

because

they never

thereafter appeared on any pleadings or papers in the case, except notices
sent by Mr. Barker.
September 5,
execution,

When Mr. Edmunds appeared before the court on

1978, the time set for the hearing of plaintiff's motion for

it was

represented that time was needed in order to permit

defendants to obtain new counsel, nothing being said by any party or by the
court about the fact that somewhere in the record the names of Joseph Bottum
and Clyde C. Patterson can be found.
This case has some of the elements that were present in Westinghouse
Electric

~

Company v. Paul

Yi.

Larsen Contractor, Inc. , 544 P. 2d 876

(Utah 1975), in which this court found that a trial court had abused its
discretion in refusing to vacate a judgment.

In that case, considerable time

had been used in connection with discovery procedures; the defendant claimed
that the plaintiff had failed to produce invoices and records as requested,
and that the failure to provide the information substantially impaired the
defendant's ability to defend the action.

The defendant filed a request for

the production of voluminous documents in September of 1973.

They were not

produced within the time required by the rule and counsel for the plaintiff
telephoned the defendant's counsel in May, 1974, and left a message that the
records

were

at

the

plaintiff's

office,

and

because

defendant's counsel should come there to examine them.
some discovery

was

of

their

volume,

Thereafter, while

still pending, the trial court on February 27,

1975,

granted defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute the action.
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The dismissal was with prejudice.

The plaintiff moved under Rule 60(b) to

vacate the order, the motion was denied by the trial court, and the plaintiff
appealed, contending that the court had abused its discretion.
This court considered that the question on review was whether the
granting of the motion to dismiss with prejudice was an abuse of discretion.
In holding that there was an abuse of discretion and that the judgment should

be vacated, the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Crockett, said:
* * *these observations are pertinent: although there was
unusual delay in getting this case to trial, this was due in
large part to the unusual circumstances delineated above.
Further, we are not impressed that the defendants themselves
were overly diligent or manifest any particular haste in getting
the pretrial discovery procedures completed and on with the
trial.
They did not do so in responsive action to
Westinghouse's having assembled records, nor to the latter's
messages concerning their availability, nor did they seek any
assistance from the court.
It is indeed commendable-to handle cases with dispatch and
to move calendars with expedition in order to keep them up to
date. But it is even more important to keep in mind that the
very reason for the existence of courts is to afford disputants
an opportunity to be heard and to do justice between them. In
conformity with that principal the courts generally tend to favor
granting relief from default judgments were there is any
reasonable excuse, unless it will result in substantial prejudice
or injustice to the adverse party.

CONCLUSION
This is a case in which

the

defendants

are being subjected to a

substantial and burdensome judgment because of a commingling of counsel's
neglect,

abuse

misrepresentations

of

the
to

the

discovery
court,

processes,
and,

procedural

ultimately,

the

misconception of the tenor of an order previously entered.

obfuscations,
trial

court's

It is a case that

should be tried on the merits since the defendants have raised a defense,
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....

which if established, is meritorious, i.e. , that they gave to the president of
Empire Corporation money with which to pay off the Valley Bank and Trust
Company note and that instead of paying it off he caused it to be transferred
to Empire Corporation; and that it was the president and managing officer of
Empire Corporation who, if anyone, was the alter ego of Empire Credit, Inc.
It seems clear that if Judge Taylor had been aware of the character of
the order entered by Judge Conder in this case that he would not have
denied the motion to vacate the judgment.

Moreover, his order of September,

1978, was influenced by a misconception of the law of discovery.

While one

of the orders signed by Judge Conder required that the Interrogatory No. 10
be answered. "truthfully," it has been held that failure of a party to answer

an interrogatory truthfully is not ground for imposition of the sanctions of
Rule 37, but may be only a ground for initiating a perjury complaint.

See 4A

Moore's Federal Practice (2d Ed), 11 37.06, p. 37-103, note 29.
Because of the misconception of counsel and court as to the duties
placed on defendants by Judge Conder's order of December 9, 1977; because
of the confusing nature of the record, because of the neglect of counsel; and
because of the refusal of the court to follow its own rules with respect to
withdrawal of counsel, the defendants in this case were denied a trial on the
merits.

The court's refusal to vacate the judgment of October 29, 1976, or of

September 13,

1978

(whichever

was

the

"judgment"),

was

an

abuse of

discretion and this court should reverse and remand the case to the trial
court with directions to permit the parties to proceed to trial.
Respectfully submitted,

Bryce E. Roe
ROE AND FOWLER
340 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendants
and Appellants
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